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ABSTRACT: The debate over persistence currently involves three competing theories—one
three-dimensionalist theory called “endurantism” and two four-dimensionalist theories called
“perdurantism” and “exdurantism.” This inner debate between the latter two persistence theories
is what I aim to clarify, and ultimately, I argue that perdurantism is superior to exdurantism
because exdurantism is too extravagant in counting ordinary objects in the world. Extravagant
for the reason that objects in their entirety are bound to their momentary stages, and there is
practically an interminable number of these stages, which is not reasonable when counting in the
ordinary world.
Perdurantism
With a presumed ontology of eternalism and concomitant mereology of temporal parthood,
perdurantists formulate that any object—and by “object” I mean any material object simpliciter,
not an immaterial object—at a specific time slice t is not at that time slice t a complete object
but, rather, that an object is the amalgamation of all its parts extended throughout its spacetime
career. The object that retains its identity—all while persisting within time even though its states
and relations change—is called a four-dimensional worm, continuant, or perdurant.
Two four-dimensionalist persistence theories—perdurantism/worm theory and
exdurantism/stage theory—do not disagree that there are temporal parts or that there are such
things as continuants, but the question is this: Which do we identify as the object—the stage or
the continuant? As we will see below, for the stage theorist, an ordinary object like an apple is an
instantaneous stage (which makes up an aggregate continuant), but for the worm theorist, the
apple is the actual continuant (which is made up from the sum of its temporally extended parts).
As a perdurantist, all objects are considered to be four-dimensional worms and they make up the
different regions of spacetime. It is a fusion of all the perdurant’s instantaneous time slices
compiled and blended into a complete mereological whole. Conservative philosophers note that
one cannot perceive temporal extension like we can perceive spatially extended objects, but
perdurantists hold that the composite of all the time slices and their regions of space spread out
from the first moment of a continuant’s existence until its last create the four-dimensional
spacetime worm.
What Parts Change and Are They Indeterminate?
Perdurantism posits that temporal parts alone are what ultimately change. David Lewis in
On The Plurality of World states that change is “the possession of different properties by
different temporal parts of an object” (12). As your life proceeds, you become more temporally
spread out through the four-dimensional manifold with every moment accumulating in the form
of successive time slices that overlap each other. Just as there is spatial overlap (e.g., the Atlantic
Ocean and the Pacific Ocean both overlap at their boundaries at the horn of South America), so
too is there temporal overlap (viz. the time slices t1 and t2 both overlap during a continuant’s
spacetime career).
Take any perdurant and isolate a part of its spatial region. That isolated spatial part has a
corresponding temporal part to match it. We can imagine an object, or four-dimensional worm:
an apple. This object is not just spatially extended but temporally extended. The complete view
of the apple includes its coming to be from the blossom, its development, and its final decay.
Each of these stages is a temporal time slice of the apple, but by viewing an object as temporally
extended, perdurantism views the object in its entirety. A perduring object extends through space
through the function of pertension. Josh Parsons defined “pertension” as the act of an object
“filling space by having distinct parts in distinct places,” which means that “space-time, if it
exists, extends by pertending, and persists by perduring” (italics added, 404, 405). Contrast this
view of spacetime extension to a duo of diametrically opposed positions, endurantism and
exdurantism, which consider an object to have absolutely no extension through time because any
object is already wholly present at each slice of its spacetime career.
Both being four-dimensionalist theories, perdurantism and exdurantism confront the
problem of ontic vagueness differently. Indeterminacy for perdurantism stems from the
beginning and end of a continuant’s existence, namely, when is the moment of fission or fusion,
i.e., when do the various time slices that make up an object split (fission) or join (fusion)? These
blurry boundaries, or gray areas, suggest that it is not possible to pin down precisely the
spacetime career of four-dimensional objects during fission or fusion. Are we referring to a
single object twice or two numerically distinct objects?
Perdurantism retorts that these blurry areas are from imprecise definitions of what the
identity of an object is. As long as we continue to have unclear semantic content pertaining to the
reference of a word, which regularly happens in any sorites paradox, then there will be, at least
for those words, vagueness. According to Lewis, ontic vagueness does not come from the object
itself but from our own “semantic indecision” (212–3). This ubiquitous decision of turning the
vague to something that is determinate happens so often in everyday life that it is unavoidable to
try to live any differently. To demonstrate how an object has a determinate identity, imagine the
following example. Hollywood Freeway and Freeway 101 overlap in front of Universal Studios
Hollywood (USH) but split just north of it. Question: How many freeways are there in front of
USH? A perdurantist would answer, “Two. One of them (Freeway 101) goes west and gets to be
called ‘Ventura Freeway,’ and the other one (Hollywood Freeway) goes north and gets to be
called ‘170.’”
This area of overlap is not indeterminate because we have made a semantic decision
regarding where each freeway begins and ends. Therefore, when our language is precise,
definitive, and decisive about vague concepts, we can have statements that have determinate
truth-values that reference exact identity.
Identity also cannot be vague because vague identity is logically impossible. Nathan
Salmon, in Reference and Essence, explicates this with the following sound argument:
Suppose there is a pair of entities x and y […] such that it is vague […] whether they are one
and the very same thing. Then the pair <x,y> is quite definitely not the same pair as <x,x>,
since it is determinately true that x is one and the very same thing as itself. It follows that x
and y must be distinct. But then it is not vague whether they are identical or distinct. [243]
Therefore, as long as we are precise about defining what is “x” and what is “y,” then we can
have determinate truth-value statements that reference identity.
What Is a Whole Object and How Many Objects Are There?
A single ordinary object is the collection of all its temporal parts from its entire spacetime
career. There is only one partially present object that perdures with time. An object is partially
spread out with time, meaning that any object from only one moment is not that object in its
entirety. Employing an atemporal perspective is exercised by four-dimensionalism to
contemplate the whole of time and to characterize temporal parthood under such a notion (Sider,
57). An entire object (i.e., a mereological whole) is the sum of all its temporal parts; e.g., an
apple as a whole is really an aggregate of its temporal parts starting with the first time slice of its
existence to its final time slice. If we picture all the time slices together, we might imagine
something like a segmented worm, which is often used as a representation of how objects can be
viewed as worms: once they come into existence, their temporal range extends a certain distance
along the time axis then peter out of existence.
Naturally when we see an object, we want to say that it is only one object. For something to
persist is for it as a continuant to be around for more than one moment. While an object might
only be partially whole from each moment to the next, it is still a single object. The line in the
sand between perdurantism and exdurantism revolves around the degree to which a single
temporal part envelops an object, either partially throughout the entire breadth of all its
temporally extended points, or with no parts being left from each individually unextended
object-stage. This latter vision for persistence comes in two strains: one from Theodore Sider and
another from Katherine Hawley. While Hawley posits that there is nothing that is over and above
the stages themselves, Sider argues that there are additional supervenient objects that supervene
without any restriction on their stages. These additional objects are four-dimensional
object-stages, or as he sees it, continuants.
Exdurantism
Exdurantism, like perdurantism, presumes the temporal ontology of eternalism. With this
alternative four-dimensionalist persistence theory, however, ordinary objects are no longer
perduring worms but, rather, are wholly present instantaneous stages. Moreover, things also do
not gain or lose properties/parts because each distinct stage has all these properties/parts in their
entirety from one counterpart stage to the next. With endurantism and perdurantism both being
the original duo in the persistence debate, exdurantism came to the scene as a slight combination
of the two. Yuri Balashov recognized this when stating, “Like perdurantism, stage theory
[exdurantism] endorses the existence of temporal parts, or stages. But like endurantism (and
contrary to perdurantism), stage theory typically identifies ordinary objects with 3D entities that
are wholly located at momentary regions that lack temporal extension” (“Persistence,” 14). Two
varieties of stage theory incorporate unrestricted composition and counterparts theory.
Unrestricted composition, also known as universalism, holds “that necessarily for any ys those ys
compose a further object” (Effingham, 241). Such a composition could be any sum of
spatiotemporal parts, regardless of how disconnected and gerrymandered the object is.
Sider’s stage theory emphasizes temporal counterpart relations. Such a counterparts theory
posits time to be relational from one counterpart stage to the next. Exdurantists think that two
stages can be temporal counterparts if they come from the same sortal; e.g., a Scottish-terrier
stage can never be a temporal counterpart of a person stage but could be a temporal counterpart
of another Scottish-terrier stage. Exdurantists, however, do think that despite being a stage, an
object can be a counterpart stage to another object if those stages have similar historical
properties (Sider, 193). An exdurantist contends that an ordinary object is numerically identical
to a single stage and its temporal counterpart is numerically identical to another distinct stage,
making each stage wholly present at the moment it exists and it exists only at that moment
(Kurtz, 7). Momentary object stages are entities exclusively confined to a particular stage of the
object’s path in a four-dimensional spacetime manifold.
What Parts Change and Are They Indeterminate?
Simply put, no parts actually change. Change is a succession of dissimilar instantaneous
object-stages, which means that change, as most people know it, is illusory. An exdurantist
would contend that an object and its temporal counterpart have incompatible properties and exist
at different moments in the actual world (Kurtz, 7). Perdurantists are similar in some respect. An
exduring object, however, is wholly present at exactly one instant of time and then is gone the
next, just to have its temporal counterpart momentarily replace it. The stage that the apple is
located at is only a corresponding stage of the apple’s path. When we look at another stage,
which too is numerically distinct, we find an entirely new object. What is located at another stage
is a numerically distinct apple stage that is also wholly present.
The problem of ontic vagueness for an exdurantist is presented in terms of how counterpart
stages are in fact related. If it is indeterminate to tell if X and Y are the same object, then it too is
indeterminate whether the distinct stages X and Y stand in appropriate same-object relations. An
exdurantist claims a continuant to hold the same identity simply from this stage’s being similar
to a subsequent stage, which is what makes the two stages temporal counterparts. Resemblance
amongst momentary counterpart stages is insufficient to escape vagueness because similarity
itself is vague. Similar in what way? By noting when there is a similarity amongst sortals and
that there are adequate causal relations held between them, exdurantists avoid vagueness the best
they can. Counterpart theorists follow the identity of a continuant from following the relationship
among stages. The problem still lies that there is no clear cutoff point concerning what was and
what was not a counterpart of the object and whether we can really attribute a causal relationship
between the distinct momentary counterpart object-stages.
Perdurantists, as we know, say that this is a matter of identity and identity cannot be vague
because that is logically impossible. Therefore, ontic vagueness is not a matter of metaphysics at
all but about how we talk. This semantic view held by perdurantists edges as superior to the
sortal/causal relations view held by exdurantists because with the semantic view, we have the
possibility to have definitive boundaries around an object’s coming in and out of existence,
which would allow us to move past the issues of vagueness.
What Is a Whole Object and How Many Objects Are There?
For an exdurantist, there are as many objects as there are moments in a continuant’s
spacetime career, i.e., there are as many objects as there are stages of a continuant’s existence;
e.g., with a continuant like an apple, there are as many distinct objects as there are stages in the
span of the apple’s spacetime career, which is an enormous number. Perdurantists and
endurantists both think there is only one object—one continuant—that persists, while
exdurantists think that there is one continuant but a multiplicity of object-stages that exdure. If
we are to be consistent with taking the exdurantist position, then we must concede to the
following. If an object is numerically distinct from its momentary counterpart stages, then there
are far more object-stages than there are ordinary objects. As we see with exdurantism, an object
is, in fact, numerically distinct from its counterpart stages, so, therefore, there are indeed far
more object-stages than there are ordinary objects.
Contrary to perdurantism, continuants lack temporal extension because an object is wholly
present at strictly one instantaneous stage, t1, and then at t2, a numerically distinct temporal
counterpart stage containing a distinct wholly present object then momentarily exists, which is
considered by the exdurantist to be the same continuant.
Imagine a person at different stages of her life. A stage theorist would say that there is one
continuant, but if we agree that an ordinary object like a person is a momentary stage, then really,
there are many distinct people-objects. As we recall in Parsons’ work, through pertension, a
perduring object extends through space, but with a continuant as described by stage theorist,
there is no extension through spacetime, but just a succession of distinct wholly present
instantaneous counterpart stages.
Balashov has recognized this by stating, “Something persists only if it exists at more than
one moment, and an instantaneous object stage, strictly speaking, does not. One could, of course,
choose to accept this consequence and agree that exduring objects do not persist. That, however,
would undermine the claim of the advocates of stage theory that theirs is the best unified account
of persistence” (“Defining,” 144). Balashov and other stage theorists hold a different notion of
persistence. For x to persist is for it to exdure, which is for it to have different counterparts at
different temporal locations. Such entities occupy these stages only momentarily, and, as such, a
continuant is not a single object, unlike in perdurantism, which, as we recall considers a
continuant to be a single object. Due to this extravagant counting of ordinary objects,
perdurantism is the more plausible four-dimensional persistence theory.
Conclusion
Intuitively, I am one object that changes as I progress along my temporal axis. Perdurantism
keeps this intuition. Imagine we placed a few soccer balls on a table. When we ask, “How many
objects are on this table?” a perdurantist will answer in accord to the normal everyday sober
answer, which could be, “There are two soccer balls.” Exdurantism, however, holds an ordinary
object to be a momentary stage, so endurantism would respond with a much bolder claim. For
every stage of time duration on the table for the two soccer balls, meaning for every moment that
occurs that they are sitting on the table, there would be a different wholly present object per
moment. Objects in their entirety are bound to their momentary stages, and there is an enormous
number of these stages.
To respond with the answer that there is an infinite number exceeds what is reasonable. If
we consider again the soccer balls, we see two continuants but can imagine an almost infinite
number of distinct object-stages from temporal span t1 to tn. From the temporal span t1 to tn,
perdurantism upholds that a continuant as a whole is the sum of all its temporal parts, meaning
that there are only two soccer balls on the table, while exdurantism supports that an object as a
whole is a single momentary stage that changes with each stage. If the stage does not resemble
the prior stage, then it is considered a new object. Nothing is different in the act of counting of
ordinary objects for perdurantism because from the span of t1 to tn, there is only one partially
present object. This simplicity in counting objects gives perdurantism an edge over the exorbitant
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